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THE AGRICULTURAL WORKER 
PROTECTION ACT & 
FLORIDA’S MIGRANT WORKER: 
THE HANDS THAT FEED FLORIDA
FEDLINE FERJUSTE*1 
ABSTRACT
Since its enactment in 1982, courts have consistently misinterpreted the 
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), 
and the Eleventh Circuit Courts are no exception to this misconstruction.
Migrant workers are among the hardest-working and lowest-paid laborers 
in America, and they do not receive adequate legal protection. Congress, 
in enacting the AWPA, intended to make farmers and growers liable for 
abusing and breaching the AWPA. However, the judicial system has allowed 
them to create loopholes to escape liability. In order to break the cycle of 
abuse placed upon migrant workers, Florida must pass new legislation to 
reform and strengthen the AWPA and its legislatively intended purpose. 
If new legislation is not enacted, Florida will become a slave labor state 
because the lack of protection will ultimately turn back time and create an 
implicit form of slave labor. 
 
* B.S., University of South Florida in Tampa, FL, December 2004. Juris Doctorate, 
Florida A&M University College of Law, May 2009. LL.M. in Taxation, The University of 
Alabama School of Law, Tuscaloosa, AL, July 2011. Special thanks to Professor Rhonda 
Reaves at Florida A&M University College of Law for her inspiration and Gregory Schell, 
Managing Attorney at Florida Rural Legal Services.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
 It is fi ve thirty in the morning in a parking lot in Immokalee, Florida, 
where hundreds of laborers wait for a bus to take them to the tomato fi elds. 
Sadly, these workers may have to leave without being paid for their time if it 
rains while they are in the fi eld.1 
 Even though Florida has a $62 billion agricultural industry, migrant 
workers, like the ones in the tomato fi elds of Immokalee, earn about forty-
fi ve cents for every thirty-two pound bucket of tomatoes they pick.2 Laborers, 
including agricultural workers in Florida, earn an average of $200.00 per 
week, comprising a segment of an unregulated system established to keep the 
cost of food down, while keeping Americans’ plates full. 
 The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”)3 
is the federal law designed to shield migrant farm workers from exploitative 
working conditions,  and to protect vulnerable migrant and seasonal 
1. Bernie Sanders, The Harvest of Shame, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2008, 11:01 
AM), http://www.huffi ngtonpost.com/rep-bernie-sanders/the-harvest-of-shame_b_96759.
html.
2. See Christine Evans et al., Modern Day Slavery, PALM BEACH POST (Dec. 7, 2003),
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/moderndayslavery/content/moderndayslavery/reports/
day1_main1207.html.
3. The Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (“AWPA”), 29 
U.S.C. §§ 1801–1872 (2006), succeeded the Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 
1963 (“FLCRA”), Pub. L. No. 88-582, 78 Stat. 920 (repealed 1983), which was designed 
to regulate independent contractors who supplied laborers for farms across the nation. The 
AWPA’s scope is broader than that of the FLCRA. See Sherylle Gordon, Note, Michigan 
Housing Laws Should Apply To Migrant Farm Workers, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1849, 1857 
(1995) (arguing that farm labor contractor status is no longer the sole qualifi cation to trigger 
liability under the AWPA). Gordon asserts that, “instead, the AWPA requires the following 
categories of persons to adhere to certain worker protection requirements: (1) farm labor 
contractors, (2) agricultural associations, (3) agricultural employers, and (4) any persons 
who own or control farm worker housing.”  Id.
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agricultural workers from abuse.4 In Florida, migrant workers’ rights have 
not been adequately protected because Florida courts—specifi cally in the 
Eleventh Circuit—have not effectively enforced the AWPA.5  
 This Article addresses the misinterpretation of the AWPA and the failure 
to enforce basic worker protections. Part II lays out common defenses used 
by fruit and vegetable growers to avoid liability under the AWPA, based on 
whether a migrant worker is an “employee” of the grower under the statutory 
defi nition.6 Part III touches on the AWPA’s joint employment doctrine, which 
provides that workers may be considered employees of both a grower and 
a crewleader—the intermediary—who recruits, transports, and supervises 
migrant and seasonal workers.7 Part IV focuses on how the Eleventh Circuit 
has misinterpreted the AWPA by incorrectly applying the joint employment 
test and holding that a migrant worker is solely an employee of the 
crewleader and not of the grower—as exemplifi ed by the decision of Aimable 
v. Long & Scott Farms.8 This section will also address the consequences 
of that decision, which has left migrant workers with no recourse because 
crewleaders are often judgment-proof.9 Finally, Part V suggests that the 
Florida legislature should correct this problem by requiring crewleaders to 
have a surety bond to ensure that migrant workers are compensated when 
crewleaders violate the AWPA.10
  
4. See Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act § 1801 (stating 
that the purpose of the AWPA is to regulate activities detrimental to migrant and seasonal 
agricultural workers).
5. See, e.g., Renteria-Marin v. Ag-Mart Produce, Inc., 537 F.3d 1321, 1327 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (fi nding that the plain language construction of the terms “controls a facility” 
does not include supervising crew leaders because the statute, by referring to the person 
owning or controlling the facility, targeted the persons who “effectuat[ed] the maintenance 
of, inter alia, plumbing, electricity, sanitation, fi re safety equipment and cleanliness in 
compliance with applicable federal and state standards.”).
6. See discussion infra Part II.B (stating that because the term employ within the 
AWPA is based on an ambiguous defi nition in the FLSA, the relationship between a grower 
and a migrant worker often requires a detailed analysis of caselaw).
7. See discussion infra Part III (defi ning agricultural association, employees and 
farm labor contractors under the AWPA).
8. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B, Part V (analyzing the courts decision that even 
though the grower had contracted with a farm labor contractor the farm labor contractor 
was the sole employer).
9. See discussion infra Part IV.A (arguing that because the 11th Circuit misapplied 
the AWPA in Aimable, in order to protect immigrant workers, it must require surety bonds 
for crewleaders .
10. See id.
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II. THE LEGISLATURE’S ANSWER TO THE MIGRANT WORKERS’ QUANDARY
 A.     Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
In 1982, testimony before the House Committee on Education and Labor 
described patterns of abuse and exploitation of farmworkers, and led to the 
enactment of the AWPA.11 The AWPA was passed in 1983, and repealed the 
Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963 (“FLCRA”).12 The FLCRA 
provided limited protection to agricultural workers from the “low wages, long 
hours and poor working conditions” that have long plagued the industry.13 
The FLCRA imposed certain requirements, particularly on crewleaders rather 
than on the growers that own or operate the farm.14 For example, this Act 
required crewleaders to register with the Department of Labor (“DOL”) by 
providing information regarding their methods of operation as contractors.15 
Additionally, crewleaders had to provide proof of public liability insurance, or 
proof of fi nancial responsibility, for all vehicles used in the business.16  
Similarly, the AWPA provides for wage, employment, and safety protections 
for migrant and seasonal agricultural workers.17 Like the FLCRA, the AWPA 
defi nes the DOL registration requirements for farm labor contractors and also 
requires farm labor contractors and their employees to obtain a certifi cate of 
registration from the DOL before starting any farm labor contracting activities.18
 The AWPA, however, was adopted for the broad purpose of protecting 
migrant and agricultural workers, and it regulates many more aspects of
11. H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 4547, at 4548 
(“Evidence received by the Committee confi rms that many migrant and seasonal agricultural 
workers remain today, as in the past, the most abused of all workers in the United States . . 
. . Congress found that the [FLCRA] was largely ignored and not adequately enforced . . . 
testimony before Congress has shown that the Act of 1963 has failed to achieve its original 
objectives.”).
12. Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1801–
1872 (2006); Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act (“FLCRA”), 7 U.S.C. § 2041, 
repealed by Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 97-470, 
§ 523, 96 Stat. 2600 (1983).
13. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 1; accord 7 U.S.C. § 2041. The Committee on 
Education and Labor concluded, “as a result of direct evidence, that the Farm Labor 
Contractor Registration Act, as amended, has failed to reverse the historical pattern of 
abuse and exploitation of migrant and seasonal farm workers and that a completely new 
approach must be advanced.” H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 3.
14. H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 2 (fi nding that ten years after its passage, evidence 
shows that the same abuses the FLCRA addressed continued unabated).
15. 78 Stat. at 921.
16. Id.
17. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1822, 1841 (2006). Under the AWPA, a migrant 
agricultural worker is “an individual who is employed in agricultural employment of a 
seasonal or other temporary nature, and who is required to be absent overnight from his 
permanent place of residence.” § 1802(8)(A). A seasonal agricultural worker is a person 
who is “employed in agricultural employment of a seasonal or other temporary nature and 
is not required to be absent overnight from his permanent place of residence.” § 1802(10)
(A).
18. § 1811.
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the employment relationship, by establishing employment standards related 
to wages, transportation, disclosures, and record keeping.19 Furthermore, it 
provides that if housing is furnished, it must meet specifi c safety and health 
standards.20 Workers must be provided with written statements of earnings 
and deductions.21 If transportation is provided, vehicles used must be safe and 
properly insured.22 And most importantly, the AWPA provides enforcement 
provisions, including a provision granting aggrieved migrant workers a private 
right of action to sue for violations.23  
B.       Growers’ Defenses to Avoid Liability under AWPA
A grower is responsible to a migrant worker under the AWPA only if 
the grower employs the migrant worker under the statutory defi nition of 
“employ.”24 Because the defi nition of “employ” is based on an unclear 
defi nition from the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), determining whether 
a grower employs a migrant worker requires a detailed analysis of case law.25 
In enacting the AWPA, Congress acknowledged that agricultural-type labor 
often creates distinctive employment relationships.26 The most common of 
these types of relationships is a triangle between the grower, the crewleader, 
and the worker.27 Congress predicted that growers would deny responsibility 
for AWPA violations by categorizing crewleaders as independent contractors, 
not as employees of the agricultural employer or association, and categorizing 
farmworkers as employees solely of the crewleaders.28 Indeed, growers have




23. See § 1854.
24. § 1802(2), (5).
25. § 1802(5); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006 & Supp. 
IV 2010) (defi ning employ as “to suffer or permit to work”).
26. H.R. Rep. No. 97-885, at 7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, 4553 
(giving examples of many types of possible employment relationships between employees, 
employers, and contractors).
27. Id. at 6, 7 (explaining that this issue often arises where an “employer/association 
asserts that the worker in question was not an employee but an independent contractor or 
in the alternative that such worker was solely an employee of an independent contractor/
crewleader”).
28. Id.
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often been successful in using those two defenses to escape liability under 
AWPA.29   
When a court holds that a crewleader or worker is an independent contractor, 
the crewleader is directly liable to the migrant worker, but the grower is not.30 
In other words, the crewleader can be found to be the sole employer of the 
farmworker.31 Yet, crewleaders typically do not have the fi nancial resources 
to pay farmworkers’ judgments in a lawsuit, frequently making it impossible 
for the farmworker to recover damages against the crewleader.32 This lack of 
legal recourse places an economic burden on migrant farmworkers, “who are 
underpaid in the fi rst instance and who cannot realistically recover unpaid 
wages from a crewleader who is undercapitalized and nowhere to be found.”33 
29. See, e.g., Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, Inc., 20 F.3d 434, 445 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(fi nding that absent a clear showing of both the regulatory and non-regulatory factors that 
the migrant workers were economically dependent on the grower, the crewleader remains 
the sole employer of migrant workers), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 351 (1994); Howard v. 
Malcolm, 852 F.2d 101, 105 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the crewleader was the sole 
employer of migrant corn pickers because he hired them, arranged for their housing and 
transportation, bargained for corn price with grower, and set their wages); Donovan v. 
Brandel, 736 F.2d 1114, 1120 (6th Cir. 1984) (noting that migrant pickle harvesters were 
not employees but independent contractors because of their ability to perform a similar task 
throughout Michigan); Charles v. Burton, 857 F. Supp. 1574, 1581–82 (M.D. Ga. 1994) 
(invoking the AWPA’s legislative history to show there will always be situations where a 
farmer is not held to be a joint employer of a crewleader’s employees, especially where the 
farmer exercised only cursory supervision, did not determine the wages, did not have the 
authority to hire or fi re, and could not modify the individual conditions of employment, and 
was not responsible for the preparation of the payroll).
30. A crewleader is also known as farm labor contractor (“FLC”). See AWPA, 29 
U.S.C. § 1802(7) (defi ning the term “farm labor contractor” as “any person, other than 
an agricultural employer, an agricultural association, or an employee of an agricultural 
employer or agricultural association, who, for any money or other valuable consideration 
paid or promised to be paid, performs any farm labor contracting activity”); see also 
Bertrand v. Jorden, 672 F. Supp. 1417, 1419 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (establishing that the 
defendant employer “ha[d] worked as a farm labor contractor, or ‘crewleader.’”).
31. See, e.g., Aimable, 20 F.3d at 445 (conducting a multi-factor regulatory and non-
regulatory analysis and concluding that the crewleader was the sole employer because the 
employee was found to be economically dependent on the crewleader).
32.  Telephone interview with Gregory Schell, Managing Attorney, Fla. Rural Legal 
Svcs.  (Sept 19, 2008) (on fi le with author). See Antenor v. D & S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 930 
(11th Cir. 1996) (attributing agricultural workers’ inability to reverse patterns of abuse to 
crewleaders’ tendency to be insolvent and transient).  
33. Jeanne M. Glader, Note, A Harvest of Shame: The Imposition of Independent 
Contractor Status on Migrant Farmworkers and its Ramifi cations for Migrant Children, 
42 HASTINGS L.J. 1455, 1472 (1991) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Maldonado v. 
Lucca, 629 F. Supp. 483, 489 (D.N.J. 1986)).
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III.     THE JOINT EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
There are three principal classes of regulated persons under the AWPA: 
agricultural associations, agricultural employers, and farm labor contractors.34
Growers have limited obligations under AWPA, and are liable under the 
Act only if their relationship to the agricultural workers meets the statutory 
defi nition of “employ.”35 If the grower is not found to be a joint employer of 
the migrant or the seasonal worker, she avoids liability under the AWPA.36
Under the AWPA, the term “agricultural employer” means “any person 
who owns or operates a farm, ranch, processing establishment, cannery, 
gin, packing shed or nursery, or who produces or conditions seed, and who 
either recruits, solicits, hires, employs, furnishes, or transports any migrant or 
seasonal agricultural worker.”37 The term “employ” under the AWPA has the 
same meaning as under the FLSA:  “to suffer or permit to work.”38  Congress’s 
deliberate adoption of the broad defi nition of employ from the FLSA was the 
“central foundation” of the AWPA and “the best means by which to insure that 
the purposes of [the AWPA] would be fulfi lled.”39 
Despite claims by growers that crewleaders are the farmworkers’ sole 
employer, and thus are solely responsible for compliance with the AWPA, 
courts sometimes look beyond this label and hold growers and crewleaders 
liable as joint employers of farmworkers.40 The term joint employment means
34. “The term ‘agricultural association’ means any nonprofi t or cooperative 
association of farmers, growers, or ranchers, incorporated or qualifi ed under applicable 
State law, which recruits, solicits, hires, employs, furnishes, or transports any migrant or 
seasonal agricultural worker.” AWPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1802(1). 
35. § 1802(2). Growers only have to take reasonable steps to determine that the farm 
labor contractor possesses a certifi cate of registration. See § 1842. See also Antenor, 88 
F.3d at 929 (“The grower’s liability under the FLSA and the AWPA depends on whether 
they ‘employed’ the farmworkers furnished by [the independent labor contractor].”).
36. § 1802(2). See 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5) (2011) (incorporating into the AWPA 
the defi nition of joint employment relationship contained in the FLSA); see also Antenor, 
88 F.3d at 929-30 (discussing the liability of a grower if involved in joint employment 
relationship).
37. § 1802(2) (emphasis added).
38. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010);AWPA, 19 U.S.C. § 1802(5). See S. Rep. No. 89-1487 (1966), reprinted in 1966 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002 (1982) (discussing how the 1966 amendment would extend minimum 
wage protection to 390,000 agricultural workers). Congress passed the FLSA in 1938 to 
correct and eliminate those “conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum 
standard of living necessary for health, effi ciency, and general well-being of workers.” 
The FLSA establishes minimum wage; regulations concerning maximum hours; record-
keeping and reporting requirements; child labor provisions; and a system of civil and 
criminal penalties for violations of the FLSA. Although the original version of the FLSA 
excluded agricultural workers from its minimum wage protection, Congress amended the 
FLSA in 1966 to extend minimum wage protection to some agricultural workers. Id.  See 
generally, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
39. H. Rep. No. 97-885 at 7.
40. See, e.g., Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 756 (9th Cir. 
1979) (holding that the farmer and independent contractor jointly employed the worker in 
light of the level of control the farmer exercised over the workers).
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“a condition in which a single individual stands in the relation of an employee 
to two or more persons at the same time.”41 A fi nding of joint employment 
requires a case-by-case fact-based analysis.42 “If the facts establish that two 
or more alleged employers are completely disassociated with respect to the 
employment of a particular employee, a joint employment situation does not 
exist.”43
Whether an employment relationship exists between the agricultural 
employer or association and the agricultural worker, depends on whether 
the worker is economically dependent upon the agricultural employer or 
association. 44 This economic dependency test used by courts to determine 
whether a migrant or seasonal farmworker is jointly employed does not appear 
in the AWPA.45 In the legislative history of the AWPA, Congress expressly 
stated that, for joint employment purposes, the factors used in case law 
interpreting FLSA violation claims should be the controlling approach used 
by courts interpreting AWPA violations.46 Congress specifi cally endorsed 
several factors used by courts construing FLSA claims in determining joint 
employment. These elements include but are not limited to:
(1) Whether the work was a “specialty job on the production line,”47 
(2) Whether responsibility under the contracts between a labor 
contractor and an employer pass from one labor contractor to another 
without “material changes,”48 
41. 29 C.F.R. § 500.20(h)(5) (2002).
42. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Id. § 500.20(h)(5)(iii).
45. Rather, the economic dependency doctrine is a judicially constructed device 
developed by several courts in fi nding whether a worker is jointly employed by an 
entity under FLSA claims. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 
729 (1947) (fi nding that the workers were employees of the slaughterhouse since they 
were economically dependent upon the factory because the workers used the factory’s 
premises and equipment, because the workers had no independent business organization, 
and because the workers’ contracts were not individually tailored and never materially 
altered); Real, 603 F.2d at 756 (concluding that the strawberry farmer’s supervision, 
control over fertilization of plants, and provision of strawberry plants rendered the 
workers economically dependent upon the farmer and therefore fi nding an employer-
employee relationship between the farmer and workers); Sec’y of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 
F.2d 1529, 1538 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 (1988) (asserting that the 
migrant workers were economically dependent on the farmer’s land, agricultural expertise, 
equipment and marketing and accordingly were employees for the purposes of the AWPA); 
Beliz v. McLeod, 765 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1985) (determining that an employer-employee 
relationship existed between the crewmembers and the agricultural producer because the 
agricultural producer controlled and supervised how the work was to be performed and set 
the piecework rates); Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 
U.S. 850 (1983). 
46. H. R. Rep. No. 97-885 at 7.  
47. See, e.g., Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730; Hodgson v. Griffi n & Brand of 
McAllen, Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir. 1973).
48. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730. 
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(3) Whether the “premises and equipment” of the employer are used 
for the work,49 
(4) Whether the employees had a “business organization that could or 
did shift as a unit from one worksite to another,”50 
(5) Whether the work was “piecework” and not work that required 
“initiative, judgment or foresight,”51 
(6) Whether the employer exercised control over the employees’ 
work.52
In analyzing the existence of a joint employment relationship, the Supreme 
Court in Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb utilized the economic reality test 
in the context of a FLSA claim.53 In Rutherford, the DOL sought to enjoin a 
slaughterhouse and meat packing company from violating FLSA wage and 
hour provisions.54 The Court looked at the economic reality of the relationship 
between meat deboners, the slaughterhouse operator, and slaughterhouse 
owner.55 The Court sought to determine whether workers who deboned meat 
in the slaughterhouse were independent contractors or employees of either 
Rutherford Food Corporation (the slaughterhouse operator) or Kaiser Packing 
Company (the slaughterhouse owner).56 The Court proceeded to look at the 
broader circumstances of the deboners as they related to all the activities in the 
slaughterhouse, and concluded that the workers were employees of the owner, 
49. Id.; accord Griffi n & Brand, 471 F.2d at 237; Real, 603 F.2d at 754 (considering 
the alleged employees’ “investment in equipment or materials required for his task, or his 
employment of helpers”).
50. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730.  
51. See id. (noting that providing a fi nancial incentive to encourage greater output 
from the workers by lining payment to output does not result in any independent initiative 
on the part of the workers, but is more similar to piecework thereby resulting in the worker 
remaining economically dependent upon the deboning factory); see also Real, 603 F.2d at 
754 (considering “whether the service rendered requires a special skill”); Griffi n & Brand, 
471 F.2d at 236 (defi ning piece rate as the amount paid per basket picked  and stating that 
the piece rate varies with the size of the particular vegetable or fruit being harvested).
52. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730; see also Griffi n & Brand, 471 F.2d at 
237 (indicating that the farmer exercised control over the crew leaders and harvest workers 
when the farmer assigned what row or patches to harvest each day and the rate at which 
crew leaders should pay the harvest workers, including whether an hourly or piece rate is 
appropriate).
53. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 727 (fi nding that because the FLSA sought to 
improve labor conditions for workers, the standard it uses to defi ne an “employee” should 
also be used in AWPA cases).
54. See id. at 723 (examining whether there was a violation of the FLSA because the 
factory failed to keep proper records and pay appropriate overtime).
55. See id. at 726 (following the Circuit Court of Appeals’ departure from the common 
law test of determining the defi nition of an “employee” and looking at the “underlying 
economic realities”).
56. Id. at 724, 727. Rutherford owned 51% of Kaiser stock. Because Kaiser was 
operating at a loss, Rutherford advanced money for Kaiser’s operation. In 1943, Rutherford 
leased the Kaiser slaughterhouse and took over its operations. This arrangement lasted 
until 1944. Id. 
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Kaiser, as they were performing a specialty job on the production line.57 The 
Court considered Kaiser’s ownership of the plant and most of the equipment as 
well as Kasier management’s close supervision of the workers’s performance.58 
The job was essentially piecework because the deboners’ compensation did 
not actually depend on their own initiative, judgment, or foresight, as it would 
for a typical independent contractor.59 Therefore, the Court concluded that the 
employer could not label the deboners independent contractors in order to 
escape compliance with the FLSA.60
AWPA’s legislative history indicates that the absence of any one or more 
of the six factors listed above does not preclude a fi nding that an agricultural 
association or agricultural employer is a joint employer along with a farm labor 
contractor.61 Additionally, Congress recognized that the agricultural economy 
contains varied employment relationships.62 These relationships often involve 
a combination of employers, contractors and employees. In the enactment of 
the AWPA, Congress wanted to make clear that, under the construction of the 
joint employer concept, it envisioned situations in which a single employee 
may have the required employment relationship with not just one employer, 
but simultaneously with an employer and an independent contractor, or with 
several employers, with or without the inclusion of an independent contractor.63 
The focus of each inquiry, therefore, must be each employment relationship as 
it exists between the parties.64  
Whether a worker is an employee does not depend on technical or 
“isolated factors but rather on the circumstances of the whole activity.”65 It 
depends not on the form of the relationship but on the economic reality, and 
whether the employee is dependent upon that person for his livelihood.66 
57. See id. at 730 (determining that assessment of the relationship between the 
deboners and the slaughterhouse does not hinge on isolated factors, but rather on the 
entirety of the circumstances).
58. See id. (considering the ownership of the premises and the equipment factory 
a when fi nding an employer-employee relationship and proving that the de-boners were 
dependent on the managers and were therefore employees). 
59. See id. (holding that linking pay to worker output can constitute piecework which 
does entail initiative or judgment by the worker).
60. See id. (reasoning that the deboners could not constitute independent contractors 
since they did not work as a unit, they did piecework, and they relied on the slaughterhouse 
management equipment).
61. H. R. Rep. No. 97-885 at 7. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 8.
65. Rutherford Food Corp., 331 U.S. at 730.
66. Id. (looking at the entire work relationship including the extent of employee 
organization, payment structure, and managerial oversight).
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     IV. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S MISINTERPRETATION OF THE AWPA
A.       How the Eleventh Circuit has Interpreted the AWPA
The joint employment doctrine is a judicial mechanism used by courts to 
determine whether a farm labor contractor and agricultural association or 
employer jointly employ a migrant or agricultural worker for purposes of 
AWPA violations.67 In assessing the existence this relationship, the Eleventh 
Circuit has used the economic reality test promulgated in Title 29 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) and interpreted by several judicial decisions.68 
AWPA violations have also been found using the factors outlined in decisions 
construing FLSA violation claims in determining the existence of joint 
employment.69 
Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms is the seminal case in the Eleventh Circuit 
interpreting the joint employment doctrine under the AWPA.70 In Aimable, 
a grower had contracted with a farm labor contractor that would provide 
laborers to harvest its crops.  The Eleventh Circuit had to decide whether the 
grower was the joint employer of those laborers for purposes of the FLSA 
and AWPA.71 The plaintiffs, 206 migrant and seasonal farm workers, were
67. Id.   
68. 29 C.F.R. 500.20(h)(5)(iii). See, e.g., Torres-Lopez v. May, 111 F.3d 633 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (assessing whether a joint employment relationship exists by examining the 
“economic reality”—looking at the nature and degree of control of the workers, the degree 
of supervision, the power to determine methods of payment of the workers, the right to 
fi re or modify employment conditions and the preparation of payroll and the payment 
of wages);  Howard v. Malcolm, 852 F.2d 101 (4th Cir. 1988) (fi nding joint employment 
because the farmer arranged the housing, transportation, the piecework rate, tax and 
maintained work records); Dep’t of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1536-38 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (looking at the control of supervisors, profi t and loss, capital investment and 
degree of skill required to perform the work to assess the economic reality); Beliz v. W.H. 
McLeod & Sons Packing Co., 765 F.2d 1317, 1327 (5th Cir. 1985) (fi nding that control 
of the farmer over the workers is key in assessing the economic reality and the “critically 
signifi cant” factors are how specialized the nature of the work and whether the individual is 
“in business for himself”); Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181, 185–93 (5th Cir. 1983); Real v. 
Driscoll Strawberry Assocs., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) (distinguishing employees 
from independent contractors by examining the employer’s control of the workers, the 
worker’s opportunity for profi t or loss, the worker’s investment in the equipment or 
materials, whether the service requires a special skill, the degree of permanence of the 
working relationship, and whether the service rendered is an integral part of the employer’s 
business). 
69. See, e.g., Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that 
the concept of “employ” used in the AWPA includes the joint employment principles 
applicable under the FLSA); Antenor v. D&S Farms, 88 F.3d 925 (11th Cir. 1996) (viewing 
the AWPA defi nition of “employ” as the same as the FLSA defi nition); Aimable v. Long & 
Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 438 (11th Cir. 1994) (referring to the FLSA principles to defi ne 
concept of “joint employment” in the context of the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural 
Worker Protection); accord Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
21636 (N.D. Ga., March 18, 2008) (construing that both the AWPA and the FLSA defi ne 
“employer” as any entity that “suffers or permits” an individual to work).
70. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 436 (examining the district court’s summary judgment 
that the farm was not the laborers’ joint employer).
71. Id.  
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alleged to have been employed by John Miller, Jr., the farm labor contractor, 
to harvest crops grown by Long & Scott Farms—the owner and operator 
(grower) of a vegetable farm in Florida.72 One of the grower owners, Frank 
Scott, managed the day-to-day activities of the farm.73 Miller, the farm labor 
contractor, had been recruiting and supplying Scott with migrant workers for
his farm for twenty-fi ve years.74 Throughout their relationship, Scott never 
used any contractor other than Miller.75 Scott would pay Miller a fl at rate 
for each quantity of produce picked and Miller compensated the workers on 
a piece-rate basis.76 The farmworkers sued both the grower and farm labor 
contractor to recover unpaid wages—alleging that the defendants were liable 
as joint employers for violations of the FLSA and the AWPA for not paying 
them minimum wage and keeping proper records of their pay.77 
At the trial court, the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Florida held that the farm labor contractor was the sole employer of the 
farmworkers for purposes of the FLSA and the AWPA.78 On appeal, the 
Eleventh Circuit upheld these fi ndings.79 The Eleventh Circuit used factors 
formulated by other courts to determine whether a joint employment relation 
exists under the FLSA, including:80
72. Id. at 437. 
73. Frank Scott owned one-half shares in the Long & Scott farm.
74. Id. at 437.
75. Id.
76. Piece rate is a payment system where employees are paid according to how much 
they produce. For example, farmworkers are paid a predetermined amount per bucket of 
vegetables or fruits picked.  
77. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 437
78. Id. at 436.
79. Id.
80. Congress recognized that in each case interpreting joint employment under the 
FLSA, courts give a slightly different description of the fi ve or six factors used in making 
the determination of whether joint employment exist. Additionally, Congress suggested 
that the factors are not exhaustive. Id. at 438. See Hodgson v. Griffi n & Brand of McAllen, 
Inc., 471 F.2d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 1973) (using a fi ve-part test to examine the employer-
employee relationship under the FLSA); Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 
722 (1947); Real v. Driscoll Strawberry Assoc., Inc., 603 F.2d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(adopting FLSA factors to determine whether a joint relationship exists by looking at 
the degree of the employer’s control, the employees’ opportunity for profi t or loss, the 
employees’ investment in equipment, the special skills required, the permanence of 
the working relationship, and whether the service is an integral part of the employer’s 
business).
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 (1) The nature and degree of control of the workers; 
 (2) The degree of supervision, direct or indirect, of the work;
 (3) The power to determine the pay rates or the methods of payment of 
 the workers;
 (4) The right, directly or indirectly, to hire, fi re, or modify the 
 employment conditions of the workers; and  
  (5) Preparation of payroll and the payment of wages.81
In interpreting the fi ve factors, the court concluded that Long & Scott were 
not the joint employers of the farmworkers based on fi ve key fi ndings.82 First, 
the court found that the farm labor contractor, not Long & Scott, controlled the 
number of workers employed to work on the farm; the farm labor contractor 
hired and fi red specifi c individuals, and selected specifi c workers to do specifi c 
jobs.83 Second, supervision by Long & Scott was de minimis, although Long 
& Scott employees came out to the fi eld on a regular basis and occasionally 
gave Miller commands that were, in turn, relayed to the workers.84 Third, Long 
& Scott had no direct or indirect power to set or increase the workers’ wages, 
although plaintiffs argued that Long & Scott controlled the amount Miller 
received and Miller controlled the amount the workers received and therefore, 
Long & Scott controlled the amount the workers ultimately received.85 Fourth, 
Long & Scott never commanded that a particular individual be hired or fi red 
and never decided whether the workers would be paid hourly or piece-rate 
wages.86 Lastly, Miller, not Long & Scott, was responsible for calculating and 
paying each farmworker his wages.87  
81. Aimable, 20 F.3d at 438 (fi nding that none of the fi rst three factors—the three in 
dispute—supported a fi nding of joint employment).
82. See id. at 443-44.  However, the court continued its analysis by addressing six 
additional factors proposed by the plaintiff farmworkers. In its examination, the court 
determined two issues: “whether the factors were relevant to this particular case; and if 
so, whether the factor supported a fi nding of joint employment.” The court held that, in 
this case, only two of the six factors were relevant. Thus, the court created its own unique 
six-factor test for joint employment as follows: (1) Investment in equipment and facilities; 
(2) The opportunity for profi t and loss; (3) Permanency and exclusivity of employment; 
(4) The degree of skill required to perform the job; (5) Ownership of property or facilities 
where work occurred; and (6) Performance of a specialty job within the production line 
integral to the business. Id.
83. Id. at 441 (making such a determination even though the court also recognized 
that Long & Scott made all planting decisions, including which crops to plant, how much 
to plant, and how to grow the crop (e.g., decisions regarding tilling, fertilization, and 
irrigation)). 
84. Cf. Hodgson, 471 F.2d at 238 (holding that supervision is present whether orders 
are communicated directly to the laborer or indirectly through the contractor). 
85. See Aimable, 20 F.3d at 442 (explaining the indirect control Long & Scott 
possessed over the appellants).
86. See id. (illustrating how the fourth regulatory factor favors a fi nding that no joint 
employment existed).
87. See id. at 442-43 (showing how the fi fth regulatory factor does not support a 
fi nding of joint employment).
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The court concluded by stating that the farmworkers were economically 
dependent upon Miller, not upon Long & Scott.88 Moreover, taking the fi ve
factors in isolation, “the result is inescapable: Miller alone was appellants’ 
employer; no joint employment existed.”89
  B.      Why the AWPA does not Protect Migrants in Florida
The legislative history of the AWPA demonstrates that Congress intended 
to have growers ensure compliance with the AWPA.90 During the debate, Rep. 
Miller noted that:  “Agricultural employers . . . will for the fi rst time be sure 
of their duties to migrant workers. Agricultural employees will, in turn, know 
who is responsible for their protections, by fi xing responsibility on those who 
ultimately benefi t from their labors—the agricultural employer.”91 Section 
1842 of the AWPA provides that “[n]o person shall utilize the services of 
any farm labor contractor . . . unless the person fi rst takes reasonable steps to 
determine that the farm labor contractor possesses a certifi cate of registration 
which is valid and which authorizes the activity for which the contractor is 
utilized.”92 
Additionally, the legislative history of the AWPA states that Congress’s 
purpose in enacting the AWPA was to reverse the historical pattern of abuse 
and exploitation of migrant and seasonal farm workers.93 According to Gregory 
Schell, a leading AWPA attorney who has represented many migrant workers in 
AWPA violation cases, “the courts simply are not enforcing AWPA against the 
growers.”94 He went on to say that “when Congress enacted AWPA, it meant 
to regulate the crewleaders.”95 But, he further stated, “The law is doing what it 
is supposed to do, protecting migrant workers from crewleaders’ violations.”96 
The crewleaders, however, do not usually have very much money.97 Even 
when a migrant worker wins a lawsuit against a crewleader under the AWPA,
88. See id. at 445 (holding that when the court examines all of the non-regulatory 
factors in light of the fi ve regulatory factors, each of which demonstrates that the 
farmworkers were economically dependent upon Miller).
89. See id. at 443 (establishing that Aimable is still the law in the Eleventh Circuit); 
accord Luna v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21636, at *29 (fi nding 
no joint employment where the wholly-owned subsidiary hired and fi red workers and the 
parent company purchased and sold the produce). 
90. See 29 U.S.C. § 1802(2) (2006) (“The term ‘agricultural employer’ means any 
person who owns or operates a farm . . . and who either recruits, solicits, hires, employs, 
furnishes, or transports any migrant or seasonal agricultural worker.”).         
91. 128 CONG. REC. 26,008 (1982) (statement of Rep. Miller).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 1842 (2006).
93. H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 3 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4547, at 
4549.
94. Telephone interview with Gregory Schell, Managing Attorney, Fla. Rural Legal 
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the migrant usually cannot collect the damages.98 Thus, “when a person is 
riding on the back of a crewleader’s truck that is not insured, the person is just 
out of luck if he is injured [because] he has to pay his own hospital bills.”99 
Furthermore, Schell also stated that the crewleaders deduct social security
insurance from the workers’ paychecks, but the Internal Revenue Service will 
never see a dime, as many of the workers do not have valid social security 
numbers with which to collect social security payments.100 The same is true for 
alleged worker’s compensation payments collected by the growers.101  
In another Eleventh Circuit AWPA decision, Charles v. Burton,102 the 
court had to decide whether the growers were liable for actual damages to 
the farmworkers for the growers’ failure to verify the farm labor contractor’s 
registration and insurance.103 In Burton, the farm labor contractor’s uninsured 
truck overturned on the highway while driving the workers to the growers’ 
farm, killing and seriously injuring several farmworkers aboard the truck.104 
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s holding that the growers’ 
failure to check the farm labor contractor’s certifi cate of registration precluded 
the workers from having access to insurance coverage.105 In reversing, the 
court reasoned that if the growers had utilized a farm labor contractor with a 
valid certifi cate of registration, there would have been insurance coverage for 
the workers’ physical injuries.106 Thus, the court concluded that the growers 
violated the AWPA and therefore were liable for the workers’ lost wages and 
medical care.107
The district court’s ruling in Burton shows some courts’ refusal to hold 
growers liable under the AWPA, even where the grower blatantly violated the 
act by not checking the farm labor contractor’s certifi cate of registration.108 
The decision had to be reversed on appeal in order to hold the grower liable. 
During a phone interview, Gregory Schell explained why such decisions are 




101. Id.; see also Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1335-36 (11th Cir. 1999) (failing 
to check worker’s certifi cate of registration).
102. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1322.
103. 29 U.S.C. § 1842 (2006) (requiring farm labor contractor to possess the certifi cate 
of registration); § 1841(b) (requiring vehicles used for transporting migrants to carry 
insurance or a liability bond). 
104. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1326. 
105. Id. at 1335 (explaining that the trial court found that checking the farm labor 
contractor’s license was too far removed from the type of harm the workers suffered). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 1336. 
108. Id.
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 [N]obody cares about these people. The fact is the majority of 
 these workers are undocumented which saves the company 
 that hires them a  lot of money because the labor is cheap.
 The government does not care about them either, because
 they are minorities. They don’t pay taxes; they don’t pay
 campaign contributions, and therefore [they], are not [a] priority
 on anyone’s list. [This is why] so many bills intended to protect 
 them fail—the migrants are powerless.109
     V.  FLORIDA SHOULD REQUIRE CONTRACTORS TO HAVE SURETY BONDS
In enacting AWPA, Congress adopted the joint employment doctrine to aid 
courts in enforcing AWPA violations.110 At the same time, when a worker is 
found not to be an employee of the agricultural association or the employer, 
the farmworker is often left without recourse for his injuries.111 Still, enacting 
stricter penalties will likely not remedy the problem of judgment-proof farm 
labor contractors. Congress has already attempted this by repealing the AWPA’s 
predecessor, the FLCRA, and adopting standards that are more stringent for 
growers and farm labor contractors.112   
The author of a Note entitled, Picking Produce and Employees: Recent 
Developments in Farmworker Injustice, suggests that Congress should amend 
the AWPA and create a per se rule that migrant farmworkers are employees of 
agricultural businesses.113 The article reasoned that adopting a per se rule would 
make it impossible for large growers to avoid liability under the AWPA.114 The 
author further noted, “this per se rule should begin in the courts as a signal to 
growers that judges will no longer be fooled by the veil of a mere contractual 
agreement with a crewleader.”115 However, as with the joint employment 
doctrine, a per se rule would still be subject to judicial construction. Notably, 
inconsistent judicial construction is one of the weaknesses of the AWPA, as 
109. Telephone interview with Gregory Schell, Managing Attorney, Fla. Rural Legal 
Servs. (Sept. 19, 2008) (on fi le with author).
110. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 8 (1982).
111. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2006 & Supp. 2008). Overwhelmingly, migrant 
and seasonal farmworkers do not have social security numbers and are not employees 
of the grower. Therefore, they cannot collect worker’s compensation and unemployment 
benefi ts when they are out of work. Many migrant farmworkers come to the United States 
under the H-2A program, authorized by the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 
which permits U.S. employers to bring temporary foreign workers into the United States to 
perform seasonal agricultural work. Id.
112. H.R. REP. NO. 97-885, at 13. Farm labor contractors, agricultural employers, 
and agricultural associations that recruit workers must provide the workers with a written 
disclosure statement informing them of the wage rates, the period of employment, where 
the employment will take place, and what it will involve, as well as whether housing, 
transportation or other benefi ts are provided. 
113. Jeanne E. Varner, Note, Picking Produce and Employees: Recent Developments 
in Farmworker Injustice, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 433, 469-71 (1996).
114. Id. at 435.
115. Id. at 470. 
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courts do not apply the factors of the joint employment doctrine uniformly, and 
each court may develop its own factors where applicable.116 Thus, the per se 
rule is a dilemma with no end.  
  A.     California and Oregon: Additional Protection for Migrant Workers
In order to remedy the problems created by the joint employment loophole, 
Florida should require that crewleaders obtain a surety bond upon registering 
as a farm labor contractor.117 Such regulation already exists in at least two 
states—California and Oregon—both of which require that farm labor 
contractors be bonded before employing migrant workers. 118 
Both California and Oregon statutes provide agricultural workers added 
protections in addition to the ones already offered by AWPA.119 Whenever 
federal statutes confer certain rights and benefi ts to individuals, states can 
always provide even greater benefi ts to their citizens.120 Typically, where a 
person brings a cause of action under the federal statute, that person may sue 
under the state statute as well.121 This is because state statutes often replicate 
federal statutes pertaining to particular rights.122 In addition to the protections 
offered by the AWPA, California and Oregon agricultural workers enjoy added 
benefi ts.
116. See, e.g., Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434, 436 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(affi rming that the grower had no control over workers where the farmer gave the farm 
labor contractor general instructions as to which crops to harvest at a particular time); see 
also Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1999) (ruling the the grower 
had control where growers determined the particular fi elds that they wanted the workers to 
cultivate, determined when workers would begin picking each fi eld, and supplied workers 
with boxes); Antenor v. D&S Farms, 88 F.3d 925, 937-38 (11th Cir. 1996) (fi nding the the 
growers did have control over workers where growers told FLC how many farmworkers to 
bring each day, the growers’ foremen determined the precise moment when picking would 
commence each day, and the growers were free to directly delay or stop the workers from 
continuing their work). 
117. A surety bond is an insurance policy that pays injured parties for losses suffered 
from the bondholder’s failure to perform under a contract. 30 FLA. JUR. 2D Insurance § 27 
(2011). 
118. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1684(a)(3)  (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 
658.415(3) (2009).
119. 29 U.S.C.A § (1)(H) (1983).  For example, AWPA does require that farm labor 
contractors carry an insurance policy or liability bond. However, the grower has to verify 
coverage. Insurance is not a requisite to be a licensed farm labor contractor.
120. Cf. William J. Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual 
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977) (discussing the capacity for state constitutions to 
help protect individual liberties in a manner separate from the role of federal law and the 
United States Constitution).
121. Cf. id. at 503 (stating that the “very premise of the cases that foreclose federal 
remedies constitutes a clear call to state courts to step into the breach.”).  
122. See, e.g., People v. Disbrow, 545 P.2d 272, 280 (Cal. 1976) (“We pause . . . to 
reaffi rm the independent nature of the California Constitution and our responsibility to 
separately defi ne and protect the rights of California citizens despite confl icting decisions 
of the United States Supreme Court . . . .”)  
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The California Labor Code provides that a person shall not act as a farm 
labor contractor until the California Labor Commissioner licenses that 
person.123 The California Labor Commission must investigate an individual’s 
character, competency, and responsibility before it issues or renews his license 
as a farm labor contractor.124 The statute also requires that a person deposit with
the Labor Commissioner a surety bond in an amount based on the size of the
person’s annual payroll for all employees.125 For payrolls up to $500,000.00, 
a $25,000.00 bond is required.126 In addition, a $50,000.00 bond is required 
for payrolls of $500,000.00 to $2,000,000.00.127 For payrolls greater than 
$2,000,000.00, a $75,000.00 bond is mandated.128 Furthermore, the law 
requires that where a farm labor contractor is subject to a fi nal judgment in 
an amount equal to the bond requirement, he must deposit an additional bond 
within sixty days.129  
Additionally, farm labor contractors in California must take a written 
examination to measure their knowledge of the current laws and administrative 
regulations concerning farm labor contractors.130 A farm labor contractor 
needs a score of at least eighty-fi ve percent on the examination to pass and 
be licensed.131 Moreover, a person may take the examination no more than 
three times in a calendar year.132 The statute also mandates that a person who 
wishes to become a farm labor contractor enroll and participate in at least eight 
hours of relevant educational classes each year, chosen from a list of approved 
classes prepared by the California Labor Commissioner.133 
123. Under the California Labor Code, a farm labor contractor is any person who, 
for a fee, employs workers to render personal services in connection with the production 
of any farm products to, for, or under the direction of a third person, or who recruits, 
solicits, supplies, or hires workers on behalf of an employer engaged in the growing or 
producing of farm products, and who, for a fee, provides in connection therewith one 
or more of the following services: furnishes board, lodging, or transportation for those 
workers; supervises, times, checks, counts, weighs, or otherwise directs or measures their 
work; or disburses wage payments to these persons.  See § 1682 (2011). See § 1684(a)(6) 
(“[a] person has registered as a farm labor contractor pursuant to the federal Migrant and 
Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act (29 U.S.C. 1801 et seq.), when registration is 
required pursuant to federal law.”).
124. § 1684(a)(1)(A).
125. § 1684 (a)(3) (2006).
126. § 1684 (a)(3)(A).
127. § 1684 (a)(3)(B).
128. § 1684 (a)(3)(C). 
129. Id.
130. § 1684 (a)(5). The exam taker is assessed on his knowledge of the current laws 
and regulations regarding wages, hours, and working conditions, penalties, employee 
housing and transportation, collective bargaining, fi eld sanitation, and safe work practices 
related to pesticide use in agricultural employment setting. 
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. § 1684 (b)(2).
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Similarly, under Oregon’s Revised Statute, a person may not act as a farm 
labor contractor unless fi rst licensed by the Commissioner of the Bureau of 
Labor and Industries.134 Oregon requires that farm labor contractors carry 
surety bonds for the protection of its migrant workers.135 In contrast, Oregon 
provides farm labor contractors the option of making a cash deposit if they are 
unable to obtain the surety bond.136 While, the bond in California is based upon 
the amount of one’s payroll, in Oregon it is based on the number of employees 
a farm labor contractor has.137 
Any person may fi le an application for a license to act as a farm labor 
contractor at any offi ce of the Bureau of Labor and Industries.138 However, 
every person who acts as a farm labor contractor must furnish proof of insurance 
for any vehicles that will be utilized to transport agricultural workers.139 In
addition, each farm labor contractor applicant has to provide and maintain 
proof of fi nancial ability to pay the wages of employees and other obligations 
that may arise under this statute.140 Proof of fi nancial ability to obtain and 
carry a corporate surety bond of a company licensed to do such business in 
Oregon is necessary.141 Where a farm labor contractor cannot purchase the 
requisite surety bond, that person may establish a cash deposit or deposit 
the cash equivalent through a savings account at a bank in the name of the 
Commissioner.142  
The Commissioner acts as trustee for the employees of the farm labor 
contractor and others as their interests may appear. The farm labor contractor, 
in turn, has to deliver proof of the account and the ability to withdraw the 
funds for the Commissioner under the terms of a bond approved by the 
Commissioner.143 The amount of the bond a farm labor contractor is required 
to carry depends on the number of workers the contractor employs.144 For 
example, a $10,000 bond is required if the contractor employs up to twenty 
employees, and a $30,000 bond is required if the contractor employs over 
twenty workers.145 The statute further provides that any person who suffers lost 
wages or any other loss because of an agricultural association or the private 
nonprofi t corporation as a farm labor contractor shall have a right of action 
against the surety bond or against the bank deposit.146 In addition, any person 
134. OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415(1) (2007).
135. OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415(8) (2007).
136. § 658.415(3) (2007).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. § 658.415(2)(a) (2007).





145. § 658.415(3)(b) (2007).
146. § 658.415(8) (2007).
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who knowingly uses the services of an unlicensed farm labor contractor shall 
be personally, jointly, and severally liable along with the person acting as a 
farm labor contractor.147
In addition, Oregon makes any person jointly and severally liable with a farm 
labor contractor if that person knowingly uses the services of an unlicensed 
farm labor contractor.148 Consequently, this provision seems to indicate that 
even if a court fi nds that an agricultural association or owner is not a joint 
employer of a migrant worker for AWPA violations, the owner or association 
could still be liable under the this statute.149 For instance, in Burton, the growers 
violated AWPA by not verifying that the farm labor contractor had a valid 
certifi cate of registration. So long as the owner or association knowingly uses 
the services of an unlicensed farm, they are liable for the workers’ claims.150 
Under this approach, a court does not even need to defi ne joint employment 
in order to hold a grower liable under Oregon law for AWPA violations. The 
grower would be jointly and severally liable if it fails to verify the farm labor 
contractor’s certifi cate of registration.
Requiring farm labor contractors to take an exam holds the individuals to a 
greater standard, as contractors should know the laws that can potentially affect 
their status as farm labor contractors.151 The exam ensures that before someone 
even applies to be a licensed farm labor contractor, that person already knows 
the standard to which he must conform.152 Requiring farm labor contractors to 
carry surety bonds ensures that workers are compensated for injuries suffered 
from farm labor contractors’ non-compliance with AWPA and the California 
Code.153  
 B.      Florida Should Follow Oregon’s Surety Bond Law
Often, migrant workers cannot collect on civil judgments won under AWPA. 
This is because farm labor contractors usually do not have the fi nancial 
ability to pay the judgments, and the growers who have the economic ability 
to pay are found not to be the employer of the migrant worker. In order to 
further AWPA’s statutory purpose, the Florida legislature should enact a law 
similar to Oregon’s—requiring crewleaders to carry surety bond. The statute 
should require proof of surety bond before a person can become a farm 
labor contractor. And in the event a grower fails to verify that the farm labor 
contractor meets this requirement, the grower would be jointly and severally 
liable to the migrant workers for any injuries sustained. The Oregon law 
147. See § 658.419. 





153. § 1684(a)(3)(C) (2006). 
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provides more protection and fl exibility than the California law. For instance, 
in Oregon the farm labor contractor can have a bond or a cash deposit.154 
Furthermore, Oregon makes any person jointly liable under the act for known 
violations.155 Moreover, just like Oregon, Florida should make the amount of 
bond based on the number of personnel a farm labor contractor employs. In 
addition, Florida should establish a commission that would oversee and act as 
trustee for any bonds paid and maintained. By enacting this legislation, Florida 
migrant workers would fi nally have the much-needed protection they lack in 
the event of incidents like the one in Burton.156 For example, under current 
law, if a migrant worker incurs bodily injury or death while being transported 
by a farm labor contractor and the contractor does not have liability insurance, 
the migrant worker does not get compensation for medical expenses or lost
wages.157 Under this new recommended law, whether a farm labor contractor
is underinsured or uninsured, the surety bond would help pay for the medical 
expenses and lost wages of the migrant worker.  
While the AWPA states that a farm labor contractor should not transport 
workers in its vehicle unless insured, contractors often break this rule.158 The 
AWPA does not require that farm labor contractors fi rst obtain insurance 
in order to obtain their farm labor contractor status. The Oregon law deals 
precisely with this issue, requiring a person who wants to apply to be a farm 
labor contractor to fi rst have a surety bond approved by the Commissioner of 
Labor.159  
This mandatory policy would aid migrants like the ones in Burton.160 In 
Burton, since the farm labor contractor’s truck was uninsured and the migrants 
could not get medical care or compensation for lost wages.161 Burton would 
have ended differently had Florida required the crewleader to have a surety 
bond, which would have compensated the migrant workers for the injuries 
sustained in that crash. Additionally, the grower would be jointly and severally 
liable for its failure to validate the farm labor contractor’s valid certifi cate of
154. § 658.415(3) (2007).
155. § 658.415(7)(a) (2007).
156. Charles v. Burton, 169 F.3d 1322, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999) (fi nding that farmworkers 
were unable to obtain medical care and compensation for lost wages because the farm 
labor contractor did not have a valid certifi cate of registration and therefore no insurance 
coverage on the vehicle).
157. See generally Aimable v. Long & Scott Farms, 20 F.3d 434 (11th Cir. 1994) 
(discussing the factors used to determine joint employer status, as well as related 
responsibilities).  
158. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1326.
159. OR. REV. STAT. § 658.415(3) (2007). 
160. Burton, 169 F.3d at 1322, 1326. 
161. See Burton, 169 F.3d at 1325-26. Although beyond the scope of this paper, a 
number of migrant workers may be eligible for workers compensation, insurance paid for 
by an employer, which provides cash benefi ts and medical care if an employee sustains 
job-related injury or illness. On the other hand, a person has to be an employee in order to 
fi le a worker’s compensation claim, which brings back to the table the joint employment 
doctrine discussion.  
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registration. The uncompensated damages suffered by the migrants were the 
result of the farm labor contractor’s truck’s lack of insurance. 
By mandating that crewleaders carry a surety bond, migrant and agricultural 
workers will be less likely to suffer from the grave economic hardship like 
that suffered by the workers in Burton. The surety bond would provide some 
relief so that the migrant workers can be compensated if they win a claim 
against the farm labor contractor. Moreover, this statute would eliminate the 
need for the joint employment doctrine because migrant workers would have 
some expectation of compensation for injuries suffered. 
VI.      CONCLUSION
 The AWPA provides many necessary protections for migrant workers. 
However, these protections are only available if the farmworkers are found to 
be employees under the statutory defi nition.162 When courts, like the Eleventh 
Circuit in Aimable, misapply the joint employment doctrine and fi nd that 
migrant farmworkers are not employees of the growers on whose land they 
work—it is as if the AWPA does not exist. If courts do not hold growers liable
for AWPA violations, the migrant workers have almost no hope of recovering 
the damages to which they are entitled if their farm labor contractor does not 
have the funds to pay. Courts and Congress must provide an incentive for 
growers to comply with the AWPA by implementing a surety bond requirement 
and fi nding them jointly and severally liable with the farm labor contractor 
where the grower knowingly uses the services of an unlicensed, non-bonded 
farm labor contractor. Growers would therefore not try to dodge the joint 
employment doctrine. Aimable and Burton demonstrate that without this 
type of monetary incentive, unprincipled crewleaders will continue to abuse 
workers and laws while growers look the other way.163
Migrant workers have no political voice and little power to organize for 
their own protection. They are part of an eager yet oppressed work force that 
enables Americans to purchase a half-gallon of fresh orange juice for just $3.39 
and a pound of tomatoes for only $1.29 while they earn as little as $200.00 
a week. As major contributors to Florida’s $62 billion agricultural industry, 
these workers should get more in return.
162. Compare Burton, 169 F.3d at 1336 (fi nding that appellants were employees 
under weighing factors, leading to a determination that employer appellees were liable 
for violating AWPA) with Aimable, 20 F.3d at 436 (fi nding that the weighing factors to 
determine employee status of farmworkers was insuffi cient to determine their employer).
163. Compare Aimable, 20 F.3d at 436 (determining joint employment doctrine did 
not apply because appellants could not establish suffi cient economic dependency on 
appellees), with Burton, 169 F.3d at 1336 (contending Burtons’ use of appellants’ services 
established joint employer relationship). 
